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I. INTRODUCTION
Physicians with admitting privileges at hospitals are traditionally considered
independent contractors and not hospital employees. The classification of admitting
physicians as independent contractors is important because the benefits and protections
afforded by most labor and employment laws apply only to employees. Yet these laws
tend to provide little guidance as to who qualifies as an employee. 1 Moreover, the
courts have failed to articulate a consistent test for distinguishing between employees
and independent contractors. 2 This mixed body oflaw has resulted in courts frequently
dismissing challenges brought by admitting physicians against hospitals under labor and
employment laws because the physicians were not deemed employees.
In Salamon v. Our Lady of Victory Hospital, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit (Second Circuit) challenged the long-held assumption that admitting physicians
are independent contractors for purposes ofTitle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title
VII), which prohibits employment discrimination based on sex, race, color, national
origin, and religion. 3 Relying on the common-law agency test for distinguishing between
employees and independent contractors, the Second Circuit found that a question of fact
existed as to whether the admitting physician was an employee of the hospital due to the
level of control that the hospital exercised on the physician's medical practice through
hospital standards, supervision, and corrective action.
Salamon is the most recent case to analyze the worker classification of admitting
physicians for purposes of Title VII. In Salamon, the Second Circuit addressed the
difficulties of applying the common-law agency test in the medical context and provided
an innovative framework for analyzing the physician-hospital relationship that focuses
on the level of control the hospital exercises on the physician's practice. This Article
argues that the Second Circuit's framework is superior to the approach that other circuits
have endorsed for determining the worker classification of physicians and is consistent
with the development of the physician-hospital relationship.

1

See Civil

Act of 1964, Title VII§ 701, 42 U.S.C. §
(2012) (defining an
see also Fair Labor Standards Act, 29
U.S.C. § 203(e)(l) (2012)
means any individual
an employer);
of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6) (2012) (ex1Jres:smg
that "employee" means any individual
an employer); see also Family and Medical
Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2611(3) (2012) (articulating that "employee" means any individual employed
an employer); see also Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4) (2012) (referring
to an
as an individual employed
an
see also Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §
(2012) (defining "employee" as an individual employed by any
employer).
2
See Patricia Davidson, Comment, The
Under Title VII:
Between l!lnployees
Contractors, 53 U. CIN. L. REv. 203, 204-19 (1984)
how courts employ three different tests for
between
and
independent contractors: ( 1) the common-law agency test, (2) the economic realities test, and (3) a
hybrid test that combines elements of both the common-law agency test and the economic realities
test).
3

See Salamon v. Om

Hosp., 514 F.3d 217, 228-29

Cir. 2008).
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PHYSICIAN-HOSPITAL
RELATIONSHIP
A. Hospitals as Workshops for Independent Physicians

a. The Reconceptualization ofthe Hospital in the Early 1900s

Physicians have traditionally been independent ofhospitals. 4 For most of the nineteenth
century, hospitals were primarily religious and charitable institutions for tending the sick,
rather than medical institutions intended to cure. 5 Hospitals evolved from almshouses
and other unspecialized institutions that served welfare functions for the elderly and
mentally ill. 6 Even as hospitals began treating the sick, they limited their services to
low-income patients.7 As a result, physicians performed most services for middle and
upper class patients outside ofhospitals. 8
Between 1900 and 1910, hospitals moved to the center of medical practice due to
advances in science and technology. Control over infections and improvements in
diagnostic tools allowed surgeons to operate earlier. 9 As surgery became safer and more
common, physicians became dependent on the diagnostic and therapeutic facilities
hospitals could provide. 10 Hospitals began to charge for their care and permitted
physicians practicing in their facilities to charge for their services. 11 As the demand for
hospital services increased, the number of hospitals increased from 178 in 1873 to 4,349
in 1909. 12 With these changes, the concept of the hospital evolved from "refuges for the
homeless poor ... into doctors' workshops for all types and classes ofpatients." 13
b. Physician Dominance Over the Medical Practice and Its Workplace

The conceptualization of the hospital as a workshop that makes its facilities and
equipment available to independent physicians brought important changes to its internal

4 See Robert A. Berenson et al.,
Relations:
0e11ararnm1 26 HEALTH AFFAIRS w3 l, w3 l (2007) ("Physicians
m"'"'",,,,1,,.n1 of hospitals and have used them as
in which to carry out their services.").
5

See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 145 (1949).

6

Id. at 149.

Id. at 150.
8 See id. at 157; see also Morris J. Vogel, The
1850-1920,
in HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA: ESSAYS IN SOCIAL HISTORY 105, 105-06 (1979) (noting that during the
nineteenth century "even the most difficult
procedures were performed in the home").
9 See Starr, supra note 5, at 156.

w Id.
11 See id. at 163 (noting that while "no American hospital permitted fees" in 1880, "the widely
resented rule forbidding physicians to take fees from private patients ... began to die out at the turn
of the century.").
12 See Timothy Jost, The Joint Commission on Accreditation

Health Care and the Public Interest, 24 B.C. L. REV. 835, 846 (1983) ~nirmma the increase in the
number of hospitals).
13 See Starr, supra note 5, at 146
that with medical advances, "the conscientious
nm• 01 r· 10 n became increasingly dependent on the
and therapeutic facilities which only a
could provide.").
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organization and authority distribution. Early hospitals were largely operated by hospitalbased staff. 14 Since hospitals relied on charity, trustees decided which physicians were
granted privileges, which services were provided, and which patients were admitted. 15
As hospitals came to rely on payments from the patients of physicians, independent
physicians replaced the trustees as the chief source of income for hospitals and gained
authority over the services available and the patients admitted. 16
Between 1900 and 1917, physicians enjoyed unfettered control over the medical practice
and its workplace. 17 Hospitals exercised no control over the work of physicians and
were largely insulated from associated liability. 18 As charitable institutions, hospitals
were protected from liability for the tortious conduct of physicians by the doctrine of
charitable immunity. 19 In 1914, Judge Benjamin Cardozo, writing for the New York
Court of Appeals, held in Schloendorff v. Society of N. Y Hospital that a hospital was
not liable for the tortious conduct of independent physicians. 20 Schloendorff concerned
an action against a charitable hospital for an unauthorized surgery. 21 Judge Cardozo
concluded that the wrong was that of the physicians who were pursuing an independent
calling and not the hospital. 22 Judge Cardozo reasoned that the hospital did not intend to
act through physicians, but rather for the physicians to act on their own responsibility. 23
B. Quality of Care and Medical Staff Oversight of Physicians
a. The Development ofMinimum Standards for Hospitals

As a growing number of physicians gained admitting privileges at hospitals, questions
emerged regarding the quality of patient care. 24 Surgeons generally believed that
hospitals and physicians should meet minimum requirements to ensure quality of care. 25

14

ls

Id. at 149.
Id.

16

See id. at 162
relied on donations, the trustees were vitaL But as hospitals came
to rely on receipts from patients, the doctors who brought in the patients became more
").
17

See Mark Hall, Institutional Control
Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 431, 445 (1988).

Behavior:

to Health Care Cost

18

See MILTON ROEMER & JAY FRIEDMAN, DOCTORS IN HOSPITALS: MEDICAL S1AFF ORGANIZATION AND
HosPrrAL PERFORMANCE 34 ( 1971)
was no systematic policy in voluntary hospitals toward
exercise of controls over the work of private physicians.").
19
See McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432, 436 (1876); see also SARA
ROSENBAUM ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERJCAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 789, 790(2012) (explaining that
"[t]he remarkable
about the charitable immunity doctrine was not that it existed in 1876, but
that it continued to exist into the 1950s and 1960s, long after hospitals had transformed themselves
into large economic entities serving paying and low-income patients.").
20
21

See Schloendorffv. Soc'y of NY Hospital, 211 NY 125, 130 (1914).
Id.

22
See id. at 131
that "the wrong was not that of the hospital; it was that
were not the [hospital's] servants, but were pursuing an independent calling.").
23

who

Id.

24

See SARA ROSENBAUM ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALIH CARE SYSTEM 789, 792(2012).

25

See id. (explaining that surgeons

"wide-open hospital

for the standardization of hospitals in part because a
threatened the economic interests and professional status of surgeons.").
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In 1917, the American College of Surgeons (ACS) developed minimum standards for
hospitals and a Hospital Standardization Program (HSP) to monitor compliance. 26 These
standards were meant to organize hospital facilities and clarify the roles of hospitals and
physicians in maintaining quality of care. 27 The HSP was the predecessor of the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH). 28
Adherence to the ACS standards was voluntary and compliance was widely resisted. 29
However, compliance with these standards became a requirement for participation in
private and public licensing, certification, and financing programs. 30 States modeled
their licensure statutes after the ACS standards and backed them with enforcement
authority. 31 The Medicare program relied on the ACS standards to certify hospitals for
participation in the program. 32 In addition, some health plans required compliance with
the standards as a condition of participation. 33
b. Medical Staff Oversight ofPhysicians

The ACS standards solidified the modern organizational structure of a hospital consisting
of the governing body, administrative staff, and medical staff. 34 The standards provided
for the self-regulation of physicians through an organized medical staff charged with
adopting, with the consent of the hospital's governing body, medical staff bylaws. 35
The bylaws set the organization of the medical staff, defined its relationship with the
hospital, and delineated the procedures by which staff privileges would be granted and
corrective actions taken against physicians. 36
The legal status of the medical staff quickly became subject to debate. Following the
characterization of the medical staff as a self-governing body consisting of independent
physicians, some courts recognized the medical staff as a legal entity separate from

26 Id. at 793.
27

Id

2s

Id.

29

See id. at 793 ("[Cjompliance [to the standards] was
resisted, not
the less elite
but also
most physicians who wanted to avoid bitter mt1·a-r1rnless:mnlal
");see also LOYAL DAVIS, FELLOWSHIP OF SURGEONS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF
SuRGEONS 230 (1981)
the
to the ACS standards
the American Medical

general

30

and

31

See Rosenbaum, supra note 24, at 793 (explaining that states relied on the ACS standards to draft
Ji censure statutes).

32

See, e.g. 42 C.FR. § 482.22 ("The hospital must have an
medical staff that operates
the
and which is responsible for the quality of medical

under
care.").

33
See Jost, supra note 12, at 845
Cross plans).

the Provision
3s Id.
36

that accreditation is a condition of participation for Blue

A1inimum
Services, 141 ARCH. PArnOL. LAB.

and
MED.

704, 708 (2017).

Id.
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the hospital.3 7 However, most courts have declined to recognize the medical staff as a
distinct entity, noting that "[the medical staff] has no legal life of its own and is merely
one component of the hospital." 38 Courts have reasoned that the governing body must
delegate certain authority for the medical staff to exercise self-determination due to state
laws barring the corporate practice of medicine. 39
c. The Decline of the Traditional Physician-Hospital Relationship

Hospital regulation and medical staff oversight of physicians during this period
challenged the initial conceptualization of the hospital as a workshop of independent
physicians. The medical staff was a membership in a self-governing organization that
afforded physicians rights and responsibilities. Hospitals provided equipment and
staff that enabled physicians to provide medical services that they could not provide
elsewhere. 40 In exchange, physicians served on quality and utilization review committees
and undertook Emergency Department on-call responsibilities. 41
However, as a new vision of the hospital emerged as a provider of medical care, the
idea of the hospital as a "passive charity removed from operational responsibility"
faded away. 42 This shift coincided with court rulings abandoning the doctrines that
once protected hospitals from tort liability. In 1957, Judge William Fuld overruled the
doctrine of charitable immunity as applied to hospitals, as well as Judge Cardozo's
ruling in Schloendorff. 43 In Schloendorff. which involved an action against a hospital
for injuries caused by some of its nurses, Judge Fuld held that "[t]he conception that
the hospital does not undertake to treat the patient, does not undertake to act through
its doctors and nurses, but undertakes instead simply to procure them to act upon
their own responsibility, no longer reflects the fact." 44 Judge Fuld noted that hospitals
currently provide more than facilities for treatment, which is demonstrated in how
hospitals operate. 45

37

See SL John's Hosp. Med. Staffv: St. John
Med. Ctr, 245 N.W.2d 472, 473 (S.D. 1976)
the medical staff to be an
association
also Corleto v. Shore Mem'l Hosp., 350 A.2d 534, 539 (N.J 1975)
an
association).

1 u.'"''"uurnrni;

38

See Exeter Hosp. Med. Staffv. Board of Tr. of Exeter Health Res., Inc., 810 A2d 53, 56 (N.H.
2002); see also Ramey v. Hosp. Auth. of Habersham Cty., 462 S.E.2d 787, 788 (Ga. Ct. App.
1995)
that the medical staff is not a separate,
capable
sued
independently of the hospital
'-~urn1Jtug.nillu,

Comment, The

,_,,.,,,,<,,.,,,," 50 WASH. L REv. 385, 392 (1975) (noting that most state medical
practices acts would be violated
hospital administrators' attempts to exercise control over medical
treatment); see also Brown v. SL Vincent's Hosp., 222 AD. 402, 404 (NY App. Div. 1928)
that a "hospital corporation may not ... interfere with the method of treatment").
40

See Berenson, supra note 4, at w31.

41

Id

42

See Rosenbaum, supra note 24, at 794.

43

See

44

Id at 8.
Id

4s

v.

143 N.E.2d. 3, 9 (NY 1957).
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This shift was consistent with a growing recognition by the courts that hospitals have
direct duties to patients regarding quality of care. 46 In Darling v. Charleston Community
Memorial Hospital, where injuries resulted from a hospital's failure to supervise the
care provided at its facilities, the Illinois Supreme Court held that hospitals have
direct corporate responsibility for the supervision of care. 47 Following Darling, courts
have recognized a duty to screen out incompetent physicians and other providers at
the time of initial appointment or reappointment to the medical staff. 48 In Johnson v.
Misericordia Community Hospital, which involved a medical procedure that was not
performed in accord with standard medical practice, the court held a hospital liable
for failing to check with previous hospitals where the physician's privileges had been
revoked. 49 Hospitals have also been held liable for failing to monitor the performance of
physicians and terminate physicians with a record of mistakes involving patient care.so
C. Managed Care and Institutional Control Over Physicians

a. The Need to Control Health Care Costs

As hospitals gained greater responsibility over quality of care, greater pressure to
contain health care costs ensued. Throughout most of the twentieth century, hospitals
and physicians were paid a fee for each service they provided.s 1 Patients paid out-ofpocket for the services they received.s 2 However, a new system of third-party payment
emerged with the rise of health insurance coverage and the creation of Medicare. Health
insurers and Medicare paid hospitals and physicians based on the cost of each service
provided and the prevailing fee in their geographic area.s 3 These payment mechanisms
insulated hospitals and physicians from the cost of medical care and created incentives
to maximize the volume of services to receive higher payments.s 4

fO

lC<'l!UtUlt;

14 PAC. L.J. 55, 77 (1982) (describing the

of

Memorial
211 N.E.2d 253, 258 (Ill. 1965)
of care by failing to respond to apparent errors
physicians as
48
49

See, e.g., Johnson v: Misericordia Colllll:mrnty
Id.

nu>µ1cm,

301 N.W2d 156, 174

1981).

so See Elam v.
Park Hosp., 183 Cal. Rptr. 156, 161
Ct. App. 1982) (embracing that
the hospital breached duty of care
failing to monitor the performance of physician); see also
Corleto v. Shore Memorial Hosp., 350 A.2d 534, 537-38 (N.J. 1975) (noting that
breached
duty of care
failing to terminate doctor with a record of mistakes).
51
See Peter D. Jacobson & Scott D. Pomfret,
A Model
to Industrial
s2 Id.

New Legal Doctrine in
Care:
32 U. MrCH. J.L. REFORM 813, 839 (1999).

53

See Starr, supra note 5, at 385 (explaining that "Medicare and Medicaid, like Blue Cross, chose

s4

Id.

its reimbursements.").
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The 1970s opened with a crisis in health care. 55 By 1980, health care expenditures had
reached $230 billion, up from $69 billion in 1970. 56 As pressure to contain health care
expenditures increased, third-party payers began to experiment with payment methods
that moved away from the traditional fee-for-service system. In 1983, Medicare adopted
the diagnosis-related group (DRG) payment system for hospitals, under which hospitals
received a fixed amount per patient based on the patient's diagnosis rather than an
amount based on the actual treatment costs incurred. 57 Other payers, including states and
self-insured employers, began to steer patients into Health Maintenance Organizations
(HMOs), which functioned as an alternative to health insurance plans. 58 Like the DRG
system, HMOs provided patient care for a fixed per capita fee. 59
b. Institutional Control Over Physicians

Up to eighty percent of health care costs are within the control of physicians. 60 Even
though prospective payment systems did not target physicians directly, the ability
of hospitals and HMOs to control health care costs depended on the ability to exert
institutional control over physicians, whose practices had been largely unregulated.
In designing the DRG payment system, the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services recognized that "prospective payment ... provides a number of ... desired
incentives by inducing hospitals to control physician services which have associated
hospital costs."61 Similarly, the purpose ofHMOs was to manage costs by working with
physicians to provide only medically necessary and cost effective medical services. 62
Accordingly, hospitals and HMOs adopted different strategies to influence
physician behavior and reduce medical expenditures. Hospitals and HMOs adopted
preauthorization review protocols for ordering certain medications and performing
certain procedures. 63 In an effort to control costs, hospitals adopted rigid standardized
treatment protocols aimed at decreasing length of stay or the number of medical

55

Id at 381.

56

Id. at 380.

57

See Stuart Altman, The Lessons
nmtPl1UP.''

58

See Donna Horoshack et al., State
HEALTH CARE 765, 767 (Peter R. Krnm1'1v1ent

59

See Peter D. Fox et al., The
CARE 3, 6 (Peter R.

Prospective Payment
Show That The
31HEALrHAFFAIRS1923, 1924-25 (2012).
lVlllnUJ<ea

Care, in ESSENTIALS OF lvlANAGED

Care, in ESSENTIALS OF MANAGED HEALTH

rm;s"·wn Utilization, 23 MED. CARE 461 (1985); see also John
Williams, Cost Containment and
'Practice
Behavior, 246 JAMA 2195 (1981) (noting that between 50 and 80 percent of health care costs are
controlled
6I

See US. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuMAN SERVS., PAYING PHYSICIANS: CHOICE FOR MEDICARE E-8 (1988).

62

that the cost

See Peter R. Kongstvedt, ESSENTIALS OF MANAGED HEALrn CARE 6 (2007)
contaimnent and
assessment policies
health maintenance rnJSarn.~auvuo
control the mapp1ropna·teuse of medical services).
63

'-"''""'u'"'.!S· DOCTORS' DECISIONS AND THE COST OF MEDICAL CARE 130 (1986); see also
l:\1sent•erg & Williams, supra note 60, at 2198 (describing
review by uu:>~rnw.l>J.
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procedures and diagnostic tests prescribed. 64 Enforcement of these directives varied
from barring physicians from using facilities to refusing to pay for unapproved
treatment. 65 Physician education and feedback from peer review were used to influence
physician behavior and control expenditures.
Hospitals and HMOs relied on institutional inducements in the form of sanctions for
excessive treatment and rewards for conservative treatment. The Independent Practice
Associations, which compensated physicians on a discounted fee-for-service basis,
provided bonuses for efficient performance or reduced payment for inefficiency. 66
Some hospitals paid their medical staff a percentage of profits earned from Medicare
patients. 67 Other hospitals rewarded profitable physicians with in-kind or fringe benefits,
such as office space, secretarial services, and malpractice insurance. 68 These strategies
raised concerns regarding federal and state prohibitions on financial dealings between
physicians and the hospitals to which they refer patients. 69
c. The Beginning ofNew Physician-Hospital Relationships

Managed care drastically changed the nature of the relationship between physicians
and hospitals by bringing changes in both reimbursement and contracting for hospital
services. 70 Throughout most of the twentieth century, the economic incentives of
physicians and hospitals were aligned and higher reimbursements were associated with
providing more services. 71 Prospective payment mechanisms altered this relationship.
Because hospitals were paid a fixed sum per patient, administrators were no longer
indifferent to resources physicians expended in treatment. 72 Physicians were incentivized
to provide more services to receive higher payment. 73

64
See Hall, supra note 17, at 449-50 (describing treatment protocols); see also William A.
Chittenden III,
Care: History and Prognosis, 26 Trnu & INS.
L.J. 451, 456 n.28 (1991) (describing standardized
and treatment protocols by HMOs).
65

See Hall, supra note 17, at 463-64 (describing enforcement mechanisms with standardized

66

Id. at 484.

67

See id. at 486 (noting, by way of example, that the Paracelsus chain of hospitals in California
each member of the medical staff a percentage of the profits the hospital earned from that
Medicare patients).

68

See COMM. ON IMPL!CATIONS OF FoR-PROFIT ENTERPRISE IN HEALm CARE, INST. OF MED., FoRPROFIT ENTERPRISE IN HEALTH CARE 166 n.7 (1986)
different in-kind and fringe"'"'"""'"
benefits).
69

See Hall, supra note 17, at 487-88 (providing an overview of federal and state fee
prohibitions).
70

See Alison E. Cuellar & Paul J. Gertler,
Integration
J. HEALTH EcoN. 1, 3 (2006) (reasoning that "[m]anaged care brought about a

25

contracting and reimbursement").
71
See Starr, supra note 5, at 385
under fee- for-service, doctors and hospitals make more
money the more services they provide, they have an incentive to maximize the volmne of services.").

72

See Eisenberg & Williams, supra note 60, at 2198 (describing hospital cost-containment

73

Id.
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At the same time, managed care brought changes in contracting for hospital services.
Because HMOs provided care on a capitated basis, HMOs selectively contracted with
hospitals to negotiate lower prices and shift payment risk to hospitals. 74 Hospitals faced
pressure to lower costs and gain bargaining power to improve their competitive position
for managed care contracts. 75 In response, hospitals sought more strategic relationships
with physicians by acquiring physician practices, including primary care physicians, and
employing the physicians. 76 By 1998, more than 66 percent of hospitals were integrated
with a physician practice, up from 33 percent in 1993. 77
Physician integration with employed physicians was intended to help hospitals lower
costs and gain bargaining power. The expectation was that employed physicians would
be more cooperative with hospital administration to manage costs and secure more
hospital admissions. 78 Moreover, employing physicians allowed hospitals to negotiate
jointly with HM Os. Due to the risk that failure to reach an agreement would result in the
loss of both the hospitals and physicians, employing physicians helped hospitals gain
bargaining power. 79 For physicians, hospital employment provided a "shelter from an
increasingly complex and unstable market." 80
D. Increasing Competition, Quality Expectations, and Physician Employment

a. Physician-Hospital Competition Over Services

Hospitals were under economic pressure to affiliate with physicians, and an adversarial
climate with physician-owned facilities ensued. Technological advances enabled more
affordable equipment and hospital services to be performed in ambulatory settings.
Physicians began to acquire equipment and ambulatory surgical centers, which made
physicians direct competitors with hospitals. 81 By owning these facilities, physicians
74

75

See Cuellar & Gertler, supra note 70, at 3.
Id

76 See Lawton R. Bums et aL, Impact
A1arket Structure on rn•cw11;za11-n
Alliance, 35 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 101, 104 (2000).

77
See Cuellar & Gertler, supra note 70, at 2 (noting that
i.e., areas with high managed care penetration rates, are more likely to have ve1iical relationships
with physicians than hospitals in low-managed care areas; only 29 percent of hospitals in lowmanaged care areas had ve1iical relationships in 1998, compared to 70 percent of hospitals in highmanaged care areas.").
78

See id. at 3-4 (arguing that physician integration increases efficiency and quality by allmving
physicians and hospitals to achieve economies of scale); see also Lawrence Casalino & James
C. Robinson, Alternative Models
as the United States Moves
Mc.ma;r;ea Care, 81 THE MILBANK Q. 331, 338 (2003) (noting that hospitals that
employ
are more
to compel cooperation through managerial authority and secure
admissions than those with staff physicians).
79

See Cuellar & Gertler, supra note 70, at 5-6 (observing different theories
which
nh'' 0"'""n integration may be used to increase hospital market power and bargaining power with
health plans).
80

See Lm11Tence P Casalino et al.,
Relations: Two-Tracks and the Decline
the
27 HEALrn AFFAIRS 1305, 1309 (2008)
physician
motivations for integrating with hospitals).
81

See Berenson, supra note 4, at w35-w36.
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were able to capture the facility fee associated with these services that would otherwise
go to the hospital, increase consumer expectation of a "one-stop shop" for medical
services, and control their work hours and environment. 82
b. Patient Safety and Quality of Care Expectations

Hospitals also experienced increasing pressure to improve patient safety and quality of
care. In 1999, the Institute of Medicine issued its landmark report, "To Err is Human,"
which estimated that as many as 98,000 patients die annually in U.S. hospitals due to
preventable medical errors. 83 The report put health care quality in the sight of public
and private payers, leading to a number of initiatives aimed at improving patient safety
and quality of care. One of these initiatives was the publication of comparative quality
information. In 2001, the Medicare program launched the Hospital Quality Initiative. 84
Although participation was voluntary, hospitals participated to receive a payment
update. 85 In 2002, JCAH began requiring hospital quality performance reporting. 86
"Pay-for-performance" programs, an influential initiative, generally imposed financial
penalties on health care providers that failed to meet quality or performance measures. 87
These measures included process measures that focused on specific activities that
contribute to positive health outcomes, the effect of care on patients, and patient
satisfaction with the care they received at the hospital. 88 The Hospital Value-Based
Purchasing Program was another initiative where hospitals were paid on the basis of
quality measures and performance improvements. 89
c. The Rise ofPhysician Employment and its Impact on Admitting Physicians

In response to the increasingly adversarial environment with physician-owned facilities
and new pressure to improve patient safety and quality of care, hospitals explored

82

See Casalino, supra note 78, at 1310 (explaining that ownership of these facilities enables
physicians to focus on a more narrow range of procedures, which facilitates efficient scheduling
and allows for profitability); see also Berenson, supra note 4, at w34 (noting that motivating factors
included "seeking additional sources of income, increasing consumers'
of 'one-stop
shopping' for
services, and growing physician demand for control over their own work
environment").
83 See INST. OF MED., To ERR Is HuMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 31 (2000),
nap.edu/catalog/9728/to-err-is-human-building-a-safer-health-system.
84

See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAJD SERVS., HOSPITAL QUALITY INITIATIVE OVERVIEW 1 (2005),

85

Id. at 2.

86

See JOINT COMMISSION ON AcCREDITA:rlON OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS, ONGOING Acnvnrns: 2000
2004 STANDARDIZATION OF METRICS, https://w\;vw.jointcommission.org/assets/1/18/SIWG_Vision_

TO

87

See Julia James, Health
healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb2012101 l .90233/fu11/.
88

HEALTHAFFAJRS (2012), https://www.

Id. at 2.

89

See id. at 3; see also Cms. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAJD SERVS., HosrrrAL VALUE-BASED
PURCHASING 1, 3 (2017), https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-LearningNetwork-MLN/MLNProducts/downloads/Hospital_VBPurchasing_Facl_Sheet_ICN907664.pdf.
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new relationships with physicians through two main strategies: joint venturing and
physician employment. 90
Hospitals that enter into joint-venture arrangements generally expect to retain some
of the revenue the hospital would have otherwise lost to a competing physician-owned
entity. 91 For physicians, entering into a joint venture with hospitals allows them to benefit
from hospital capital and the hospital's management. 92 However, since many joint
ventures occur between not-for-profit hospitals and for-profit physician entities, such
arrangements raise concern regarding Internal Revenue Service rules on tax-exempt
status. 93 Due to the possibility of service referrals, these joint venture arrangements also
raise concern regarding the federal Anti-Kickback Statute, which generally prohibits
payment for referral of Medicaid or Medicare business. 94
Given the regulatory obstacles to establishing joint ventures, hospitals moved to a
physician employment model that was focused on employing specialists. Building on
earlier trends of employing primary care physicians, the employment of specialists
allowed hospitals to preempt competition from physician-owned facilities and increase
negotiating leverage with health plans. 95 Hospitals also employed physicians to staff
Emergency Departrnents. 96 For years, hospitals reported the unwillingness of medical
staff to cover the Emergency Department, which forced hospitals to pay generous per
di ems for physicians to assume on-call responsibilities. 97
The employment of specialists threatened hospital relationships with their medical
staff. Hospitals have isolated admitting physicians who are members of their medical
staff by emphasizing service lines that feature employed specialists. 98 Although certain
hospitals have branded their service lines with participation of employed specialists and
medical staff, many have excluded the medical staff to have greater control over how
services are provided and marketed. 99
With the rise in physician employment and its impact on medical staff physicians, the
definition of the hospital-physician relationship is underscored. 100 Pressure from thirdparty payers to control health care costs and improve patient safety urges hospitals to
ventures and
91
See Berenson, supra note 4, at w38
ventures).

New: Recent Developments in nn"'""n471, 479 (2003)
93

See Berenson, supra note 4, at w39
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reassess their relationship with employed physicians and admitting physicians, such as
the level of control the hospital wishes to exercise over physician behavior. 101 Although
hospitals may exercise control over the practice of employed physicians, exercising
too much control over members of the medical staff can place the hospital at risk of
liability. 102 Thus, the general law behind classifying admitting physicians as independent
contractors under federal labor and employment law is instructive.

III. GENERAL LAW ON CLASSIFYING PHYSICIANS AS
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS
A. Worker Classification Under Title VII

Title VII makes it unlawful for employers "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 103 The statute defines
"employee" as "an individual employed by an employer" 104 but does not clearly define
"employer." 105 Given the circularity of this definition, the legislative history ofTitle VII
is instructive to the worker classification of admitting physicians.
B. Legislative History of Worker Classification Under Title VII

The legislative history of Title VII suggests Congress permitted the classification of
some physicians as employees. 106 As part of the 1972 amendments to Title VII, Congress
considered, but did not include, a proposal to exclude physicians employed by public
or private hospitals from Title VII. 107 During Senate debate, Senator Harrison Williams
(D-NJ) warned that "[this amendment] would take from a doctor the protection that the
Constitution gives him and would protect through [Title VII]." 108 Moreover, Senator
Jacob Javits (R-NY) explained:
[T]his amendment would go back beyond decades of struggle and of injustice
and reinstate the possibility of discrimination on grounds of ethnic origin, color,
sex, religion-just confined to physicians or surgeons, one of the highest rungs
101

See Starr, supra note 5, at 385
the pressure to control health caie costs); see also
MED., To ERR Is HuMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 31 (2000), tlttt1s:/,IW\vwnat1,ecllll
\ u~'"'w"'!S how;,~···"',,;,,
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of the ladder that any member of a minority could attain-and thus lock in and
fortify the idea that being a doctor or surgeon is just too good for members of a
minority, and that they have to be subject to discrimination in respect of it, and
the Federal law will not protect them. 109
The proposed exclusion of physicians from the protections of Title VII was ultimately
defeated, allowing for the classification of some physicians as employees for purposes
of Title VII. 11 o
C. Case Law on Worker Classification for Purposes of Title VII

The uncertainty surrounding worker classification under Title VII charges the courts with
making this determination. Courts have employed three different tests for distinguishing
between employees and independent contractors: (1) the common-law agency test, (2)
the economic realities test, and (3) a hybrid test that combines elements of both the
common-law agency test and the economic realities test. 111 In the medical context, most
courts have found that admitting physicians are independent contractors who are not
covered by Title VII, but some courts have concluded that physicians may be employees
by relying on the common-law agency test.
a. Legal Tests for Distinguishing Employees from Independent Contractors
Prior to 1947, courts distinguished an employee from an independent contractor using
the common-law agency test. 112 This test focused on the degree of control the employer
exercised over the individual's work performance. 113 If the employer controlled not only
"what work should be done, but also how it should be done," the worker was deemed
an employee. 114 In Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, which involved the
worker classification of an artist, the Supreme Court noted that an important factor is
the employer's right to control the "manner and means" of the worker's performance. 115
Other factors include the skill required, the source of the instrumentalities and tools, the
location of the work, the duration of the parties' relationship, the employer's provision
of employee benefits, the tax treatment of the worker, among others. 116
In 1947, the Supreme Court held that the common-law agency test was too narrow
for determining worker classification for purposes of social legislation. 117 The Court

109

Id.

110

Id

111

See Patricia Davidson, The
Under Title VII:
1na,?pe,rzaem Contractors, 53 U. CIN. L REv. 203, 225 (1984).

112

See United States v. Silk, 331 US. 704, 713 (1947).
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then proposed the "economic realities" test, which focuses on whether the individual
is, as a matter of economic reality, dependent upon the business to which she renders
her service. 118 In applying this test, courts examine the degree of control exercised by
the employer, the extent of the relative investments of the worker and the employer,
the degree to which the worker's opportunity for profit or loss is determined by the
employer, the skill and initiative required in performing the job, and the permanency of
the relationship. 119
Notably, the courts have refrained from using the economic realities test for purposes of
Title VII. Instead, courts traditionally use the economic realities test only for determining
worker status under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). 120 Unlike Title VII, the
legislative history of the FLSA suggests that the term "employee" be given "the broadest
definition that has ever been included in any one act." 121 Some courts have applied
a hybrid of the common-law agency test and the economic realities test to determine
worker status under Title VII, through which the worker's economic dependence on
the employer is considered under the common-law principles of agency. 122 Applying
the economic realities test, courts have noted that the extent of the employer's right to
control the worker's performance is determinative. 123 In Spirides v. Reinhardt, in which
the worker classification of a foreign language broadcaster was considered, the court
held that necessary factors that apply to the consideration of worker status under the
hybrid test include whether the work performed is under the direction of a supervisor,
the skill required for the job, whether the employer furnishes the equipment used and the
place of work, and the length of time during which the individual has worked. 124
b. Case Law on the Worker Classification ofPhysicians for Purposes of Title VII

Until the mid- l 990s, courts applied the hybrid test, concluding that admitting
physicians at hospitals were independent contractors for purposes of Title VII.
In Beverly v. Douglas, where an action against a hospital for denying a physician
admitting privileges transpired, the court applied the hybrid test and found that the
physician was an independent contractor since the hospital did not exercise control
over the manner and means of the physician's performance. 125 The court noted that

are
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the physician had a practice outside the hospital, was not paid a salary, received no
benefits, and had no office space. 126 Later cases emphasized that, in addition to these
factors, the hospital did not supervise the physician's work and did not control the
details of the physician's practice. 127
The few cases during this time where the court found that physicians were employees
for purposes of Title VII identified the ways that the hospital exerted control over the
physician. For example, in Mitchell v. Frank Memorial Hospital, where an action was
brought against a hospital for wrongful termination, the court found that the physician
could bring a Title VII action because the hospital controlled the physician's practice. 128
Moreover, in Ross v. William Beaumont Hospital, where a physician brought a sex
discrimination action against a hospital, the court found that the physician was an
employee because she underwent extensive progressive discipline, including probation
and leaves of absence. 129 Finally, in Mallare v. St. Lukes Hospital, where an action
against a hospital was brought for denying a physician admitting privileges, the court
noted that the hospital exercised control over the physician's practice by retaining the
right to withdraw medical staff privileges if his performance did not comport with
hospital standards. 130
Since the mid- l 990s, the courts have relied on the common-law agency test and generally
classified physicians as independent contractors for purposes of Title VII. The initial
switch was guided by the Supreme Court's use of this test in the context of the Copyright
Act and Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). 131 The use of this test was

over the physician's work).
126

See id (noting that the physician is an independent contractor in part because staff physicians
have practices outside the hospital and staff physicians are not paid a salary).
127

See Diggs v. Harris Hosp. Methodist, lnc., 847 F.2d 270, 273 (5th Cir. 1988) (applying the
hybrid test and finding the physician to be an independent contractor because the hospital did not
direct the manner or means by which the physician rendered medical care and the hospital did
not pay salary or licensing fees nor provided benefits); see also Amro v. St Luke's Hospital, 39
FE.P 1574, 1576 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (maintaining the hybrid test and finding the physician to be an
independent contractor because the hospital did not supervise the physician's work).
128

See Mitchell v. Frank H. Mem'l Hosp., 853 F2d 762, 766 (9th Cir. l 988) (reiterating the hybrid
test and finding the physician to be an employee in part because the hospital controlled the means
and manner of his performance).
129
See Ross v. William Beaumont Hosp., 678 F Supp. 655, 675 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (assessing
the economic realities test and finding physician to be an employee in part because the physician
underwent extensive progressive discipline, such as probation and leaves of absence and the
physician "based her whole livelihood" on the hospital).

130 See Mallare v. St Luke's Hosp., 699 F Supp. 1127, 1130 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (applying hybrid
test and finding that material issues of fact existed as to whether a hospital was the employer of a
physician because "the ultimate question was control of the means and manner of job performance,"
noting that the hospital exercised control in the sense that staff privileges could be withdrawn if a
doctor's perfmmance did not comport with hospital's standards and denial of staff privileges would
severely limit his opportunity to develop a full practice).
131 See Nationwide Mut Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 US. 318, 322-23 (1992) (following Reid and
adopting the common-law agency test for determining who is an employee for purposes ofERISA);
see also Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 US. 730, 739-40 (1989) (holding that
when Congress uses the term "employee" without defining it in the context of the Copyright Act,
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solidified when the Supreme Court adopted this test for purposes of anti-discrimination
laws. 132 In determining whether the hospital exercised control over the physician's
performance, the courts highlighted the physician's ability to provide services according
to her medical judgement and determine her working hours, who to work for, and which
patients to treat. 133 These cases rejected the idea that hospitals exercised control by
imposing on-call requirements and hospital standards on physicians. 134
In 2008, the Second Circuit challenged the traditional classification of admitting
physicians as independent contractors for purposes ofTitle VII. 135 In Salamon, the court
examined what it means for a hospital to exercise control over the "manner and means" of
a physician's performance in light of the nature of the physician-hospital relationship. 136
The court focused on the means explored in Mitchell, Ross, and Mallare; namely, the
scope of hospital standards and policies, active supervision, and corrective action. 137
These means had been rejected by sister circuits. 138
Congress intended to describe the conventional "master-servant" relationship as understood by the
common-law agency doctrine).
132
See Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., PC. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 442-44 (2003)
(delineating Reid/Darden and adopting the common-law agency test for determining who is an
employee for purposes of anti-discrimination laws, stressing that "the common-law element of
control is the principal guidepost that should be followed.").
133
See Shah v. Deaconess Hosp., 355 F.3d 496, 500 (6th Cir. 2004) (concluding that the physician
was an independent contractor since the hospital could not interfere with the physician's medical
discretion or control the manner and means of his performance as a surgeon); see also Vakharia v.
Swedish Covenant Hospital, 190 F.3d 799, 805 (7th Cir. 1999) (applying the common law agency
test and concluding the physician was an independent contractor since the physician provided
services according to her professional judgement); see also Cilecek v. Inova Health Sys. Serv.,
115 F.3d 256, 259 (4th Cir. 1997) (interpreting the common-law agency test and finding that the
physician was an independent contractor since the physician exercised independence in determining
his hours, income, and who he worked for); see also Alexander v. Rush North Shore Med., 101 F.3d
487, 493 (7th Cir. 1996) (invoking the common-law agency test and concluding that the physician
was an independent contractor because the physician had authority to exercise his independent
discretion over his patients care).
134
See Pamintuan v. Nanticoke Mem'l Hosp., 192 F.3d 378, 385-86 (3d Cir. 1999) (referring to the
common-law agency test and finding the physician to be an independent contractor, while rejecting
the idea that being subject to hospital rules and standards made the physician an employee); see also
Alexander, 101 F.3d at 490 (rejecting the argument that the on-call requirement made the physician
an employee because "the details concerning performance remained within his control").
135

See Salamon v. Our Lady ofVictory Hosp., 514 F.3d 217, 220-21 (2d Cir. 2008).

136

See id. at 228.
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See Mitchell v. Frank H. Mem'l Hosp., 853 F.2d 762, 766 (9th Cir. 1988) (concluding that the
hospital controlled the means and manner of physician's performance); see also Ross v. William
Beaumont Hosp., 678 F. Supp. 655, 675 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (describing that the physician underwent
extensive progressive discipline); see also Mallare v. St. Luke's Hosp., 699 F. Supp. 1127, 1130
(E.D. Pa. 1988) (explaining that the hospital could withdraw staff privileges if physician did not
comply with rules).
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See Shah v. Deaconess Hosp., 355 F.3d 496, 500 (6th Cir. 2004) (disagreeing with the idea that
being subject to hospital rules and standards made the physician an employee); see also Vakharia v.
Swedish Covenant Hospital, 190 F.3d 799, 805 (7th Cir. 1999) (rebuffing the idea that suspension
of staff privileges is indicative of hospital control); see also Pamintuan v. Nanticoke Mem'l Hosp.,
192 F.3d 378, 385-86 (3d Cir. 1999) (objecting to the idea that subjecting physicians to hospital
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IV. SALAMON AND HOSPITAL CONTROL OVER THE PRACTICES OF
ADMITTING PHYSICIANS
Dr. Barbara Salamon practiced at Our Lady of Victory Hospital (OLV) as a member
of its medical staff. 139 Dr. Salamon filed a lawsuit against OLV claiming violations of
Title VII. She alleged that Dr. Michael Moore, Chief of the Gastroenterology Division,
sexually harassed her by making inappropriate comments and sexual advances toward
her on multiple occasions. 140 Dr. Salamon claimed that Dr. Moore retaliated by using
his administrative authority to give her negative performance reviews and subject her
practice to excessive scrutiny when she complained about his behavior. 141 The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of OLV, finding that Dr. Salamon was not an
employee under Title VII. The Second Circuit reversed and held that a question of fact
existed as to whether Dr. Salamon was an employee. 142 The parties reached a settlement
before Dr. Salamon's worker classification could be decided on trial. 143
A. Salamon's Relationship with OLV

As a member of OLV's medical staff, Dr. Salamon received clinical privileges and was
subject to the same duty as staff physicians. Her clinical privileges included the use of
hospital facilities and access to OLV's nursing and support staff. 144 Dr. Salamon set her
own hours and determined which patients to see and whether to admit them to OLV or
a different hospital. 145 However, OLV did not provide Dr. Salamon's salary, benefits,
or any other compensation. 146 As a member of OLV's medical staff, Dr. Salamon was
required to adhere to medical staff rules and by-laws, participate in staff meetings, and
cover the Emergency Department. 147 OLV also required Dr. Salamon's participation
in the hospital's Quality Assurance Program (QAP), which required practitioners to
examine the procedures that the hospital used during the quarter. 148
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B. The Alleged Harassment, Retaliation, and Increased Scrutiny

Dr. Salamon alleged that when she complained about Dr. Moore's conduct to hospital
administrators, they told her that her complaints were unfounded. 149 The administrators
informed Dr. Salamon that several ofher cases would be reviewed for quality concerns. 150
Dr. Salamon claimed that her practice was subjected to additional levels of review,
and that increased scrutiny resulted in Dr. Salamon participating in a reeducation and
mentoring program. 151
C. The Hospital's Control of the Manner and Means of the
Physician's Performance

Judge Nancy Gertner, sitting by designation and writing for the Second Circuit, relied
on Reid's framework in analyzing the law governing the worker classification of Dr.
Salamon. 152 The district court found that the first Reid factor, which focuses on the level
of control over the manner and means of a worker's performance, weighed against Dr.
Salamon since she exercised her professional judgment with regard to patient diagnosis
and treatment. 153 Judge Gertner found sufficient evidence to raise an issue about whether
the hospital controlled the manner and means by which Dr. Salamon delivered her
services. 154 Unlike the district court, Judge Gertner focused not only on Dr. Salamon's
judgment regarding diagnosis and treatment, but also on the level of control the hospital
exercised through quality standards, supervision, and corrective action. 155
a. Scope of Quality Control Procedures and Policies
Judge Gertner found that OLV exercised significant control over Dr. Salamon's practice
through the application of its quality management standards, which mandated certain
procedures, indicated the timing of other procedures, and dictated which medications to
prescribe. 156 Judge Gertnerreasoned thatthe policies were not quality assurance standards
required by health and safety concerns or for ensuring Dr. Salamon's qualifications,
but rather designed to dictate details of Dr. Salamon's practice. 157 Furthermore, Judge
Gertner noted that the purpose of these requirements was to maximize OLV's revenue. 158
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b. Supervision ofPhysicians with Admitting Privileges
Judge Gertner found that OLV exercised significant control over Dr. Salamon's practice
through active supervision. According to Dr. Salamon, excessive scrutiny began when
she declined Dr. Moore's advances. 159 Judge Gertner found that OLV's supervision was
not merely the result of negative medical outcomes but for variations from recommended
procedures. 160 Dr. Salamon contented that OLV's strict standards resulted in nearly
every one of her cases being scrutinized. 161
c. Methods for Addressing Admitting Physician Performance

Finally, Judge Gertner found that OLV exercised significant control over Dr. Salamon's
practice by subjecting her to a reeducation and mentoring program. Rather than terminate
Dr. Salamon's contract, the hospital required her to attend a reeducation program, which
was designed to change the method by which Dr. Salamon carried out her practice. 162
Judge Gertner emphasized that OLV exerted control over the manner and means of Dr.
Salamon's practice by dictating the appropriate treatment for certain conditions and the
length of some medical procedures. 163

V. REASSESSING THE ADMITTING PHYSICIAN-HOSPITAL
RELATIONSHIP AFTER SALAMON
A. The Difficulty in Applying the Common-Law Agency Test in the
Medical Context
a. Recognizing the Types of Control Inherent in the Physician-Hospital Relationship
The difficulty of applying the common-law agency test in the medical context rests on
the nature of the physician-hospital relationship. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit (Fourth Circuit) recognized, "the ultimate control of doctors performing
work at hospitals results from a competition for control that is inherent in the duty of
each to discharge properly its professional responsibility." 164 Although a physician must
have direct control to make decisions regarding medical care, the hospital must exert
conflicting control over the physician's work to discharge its professional responsibility
to patients regarding patient safety and quality of care.
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b. Failure to Consider the Control Hospitals Can Exert Over Admitting Physicians

The tension in professional control between physicians and hospitals over the discharge
of medical services has deterred courts from considering control factors indicative of
whether the admitting physician is an employee or an independent contractor. Notably,
some courts have concluded that admitting physicians are independent contractors
largely due to the assumption that hospitals cannot control a physician's practice. 165
Courts have concluded that hospitals are prohibited from interfering with a physician's
obligation to exercise her professional judgment in treating patients. 166
In several cases, courts found the control factor in the common-law agency test to weigh
in favor of hospital defendants by emphasizing that the physician provided medical
services according to her professional judgment. In Shah v. Deaconess Hospital, which
involved the revocation of a physician's surgical privileges, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit (Sixth Circuit) found that the physician was an independent
contractor since the hospital did not have the right to interfere with the physician's
medical discretion. 167 Similarly, in Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hospital, where a
physician brought an action for wrongful termination, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit (Seventh Circuit) applied the common law agency test and found
that the physician was an independent contractor because the physician followed her
professional judgment. 168 By overemphasizing the role of a physician's professional
judgment, the courts did not consider the possibility that the hospital could be exerting
control over the physicians' practices even if the physicians had discretion in treating
their patients.
Additionally, the courts have dismissed physicians' allegations regarding the extent
to which hospitals exercise control over their practices by emphasizing the role of the
physicians' professional judgment in treating patients. For example, in Alexander v.
North Shore Medical, which involved the revocation of hospital privileges, the Seventh
Circuit rejected the argument that the hospital exerted control over the physician through
its on-call requirement because "the details concerning performance of the work
remained essentially within [the physician's] control." 169 Furthermore, in Diggs v. Harris
Methodist Hospital, which also concerned the revocation ofhospital privileges, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Fifth Circuit) rejected the argument that the
hospital exercised control through active supervision during surgical procedures since
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the hospital did not control the manner and means by which the physician performed the
surgical procedure. 170 Although not addressed by the courts, hospitals may exert control
over physicians' practices even if the physicians exercised professional discretion.
Physicians have a responsibility to submit themselves to hospital standards and policies
in order for the hospitals to exercise its professional responsibility to maintain standards
of care. In Wojewski v. Rapid City Regional Hospital, which involved the revocation of
hospital privileges due to a physician's manic episode, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Eight Circuit (Eight Circuit) noted that "[the hospital] could take reasonable steps
to ensure patient safety and avoid professional liability while not attempting to control
the manner in which [the doctor] performed operations." 171 Accordingly, in Cilecek v.
!nova Health System Services, where a physician brought an action against a hospital
for wrongful termination, the Fourth Circuit noted that the physician was responsible
for cooperating with the hospital in maintaining standards of patient care. 172 In both
instances, the court found that the physicians were independent contractors without any
inquiry as to the level of control the hospitals exercised through such hospital standards.
B.Approaches to the Common-Law Agency Test in the Medical Context
Given the difficulty in applying the common-law agency test in the medical context,
courts have adopted different approaches for analyzing the extent to which a hospital
exercises control over the manner and means of a physician's performance. In Cilecek,
the Fourth Circuit proposed instead of focusing on the level of control that hospitals
exercise over the discharge of professional services, courts should focus on the level
of control the hospital exercises over administrative details incident to the services. 173
Despite the endorsement of the Fourth Circuit's approach by the Sixth and Eighth
Circuit, the Second Circuit rejected the approach in Salamon. In doing so, the court
emphasized that the issue of control over a physician's performance should focus on the
hospital's control over the "details and methods" of the work, which may be influenced
by hospital standards and policies, supervision, and corrective action.
a. Fourth Circuit's Emphasis on Administrative Details Incident to
Professional Services
In Cilecek, the admitting physician argued that the hospital where he practiced exercised
control over the manner and means of his practice through its medical staff bylaws,
which provided a mechanism for peer review and corrective action for physicians whose
practices did not meet hospital rules and regulations. 174 The Fourth Circuit recognized
that the physician was required to abide by hospital rules and regulations for the
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treatment of patients, which regulated his work in substantial detail. 175 These rules and
regulations governed "every aspect of patient care," including medical histories, physical
exams, tests and procedures, pre-requisites and post-requisites to surgical procedures,
administration of medications, among others. 176 Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit found
that the hospital did not exert control through these rules and regulations since they
relate to the standards of care that the hospital and physician must maintain. 177
Due to this dual responsibility, the Fourth Circuit found that focusing on the level of
control exercised over the discharge of professional services is less useful in the medical
context as it may be in other employer-worker relationships. 178 The court emphasized
that the type of control exerted should be viewed in the context of the work itself and
the applicable industry. 179 In the medical context, the Fourth Circuit focused on whether
the hospital controlled the physician when he performed his services and the number
of hours the physician performed services, as well as administrative details incident
to the services. 180 The court found the physician was an independent contractor since
he determined his hours, income, and which hospital he worked for. 181 Applying these
principles, both the Sixth and Eighth Circuit have found admitting physicians to be
independent contractors under Title VII. 182
b. Second Circuits Emphasis on the Details and Methods ofa
Physicians Performance
To date, the Second Circuit has been the only Court of Appeals to challenge the Fourth
Circuit's approach in Cilecek. In Salamon, the Second Circuit acknowledged the dual
responsibility that admitting physicians and hospitals have over the discharge of medical
services. 183 However, the court warned that by overemphasizing the role of professional
judgment and minimizing the control factor as the Fourth Circuit did in Cilecek,
all physicians would be carved out from the protections of the anti-discrimination
statutes. 184 Instead, the courts should focus on the control the hospital exercises over the
details and methods of a physician's work. 185
In this case, the Second Circuit focused on the level of control that the hospital exerted
on admitting physicians through hospital standards and policies, supervision, and
corrective action. While the court acknowledged that hospital standards and policies
adopted pursuant to professional and governmental standards generally do not create an
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employment relationship, the court noted that professional and governmental regulatory
standards do not dictate the detailed treatment and peer review requirements that the
hospital had implemented in this case. 186 These standards tend to concern health care
administration, record keeping, financing, liability, patients' rights, and delegation of
responsibilities. 187 Moreover, the court noted that there was evidence in this case that
some of the hospital's actions were aimed at maximizing the hospital's revenue. 188
c. The Benefits ofEndorsing the Second Circuits Approach in Salamon

The Fourth Circuit's approach to the common-law agency test focuses on the hospital's
control over administrative details incident to the physician's practice. 189 This approach
would effectively carve out all admitting physicians from the protections of Title VII
and other anti-discrimination laws. 190 By overemphasizing the level of control hospitals
exercise over a physician's services, the number ofhours worked, and the administrative
details incident to the services, courts may find that admitting physicians are independent
contractors. 191 Carving physicians out of these protections disregards congressional
purpose to allow admitting physicians to be classified as hospital employees for purposes
ofTitle VII. 192
Focusing only on the administrative details incident to a physician's services, the Fourth
Circuit's approach disregards the level of control that a hospital can exercise over the
outcome of those services through non-administrative means. 193 As the Supreme Court
noted in Reid, the proper focus of the control factor in the common-law agency test
is on the level of control the employer exercises over the result accomplished and the
manner and means by which the worker brings about that result. 194 There is nothing
intrinsic to the physician-hospital relationship that prevents a court from assessing the
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level of control that a hospital exercises over the details of a physician's practice and the
outcomes of her services through non-administrative means. 195
By disregarding the level of control that a hospital can exercise over the treatment
outcomes of a physician's services, the Fourth Circuit's approach ignores the way in
which the physician-hospital relationship has evolved. 196 The Fourth Circuit's approach
disregards the level of institutional control that hospitals have exerted on physicians
through non-administrative means like mandated procedures, supervision, or corrective
action. 197 Moreover, this approach is likely to prove increasingly unworkable. As
hospitals continue to face pressure to influence physician behavior and experiment
with physician employment, it is essential that hospitals define and differentiate the
relationships maintained with employed physicians and admitting physicians. 198
By contrast, the Second Circuit's approach considers both the level of control that
the hospital exercises over the administrative details related to a physician's services,
as well as the level of control over the discharge of such services. 199 Consistent with
Reid, this approach focuses on the level of control the hospital exercises over both the
treatment outcomes of a physician's practice and the details of her work. 200 In doing
so, the Second Circuit's approach allows some physicians to be classified as employees
for purposes of Title VII, as intended by the statute. 201 This approach recognizes the
level of institutional control that hospitals have increasingly exerted over physicians
over time. 202 As long as health care costs are primarily within the control of physicians,
hospitals are incentivized to influence physician's actions to control health care costs. 203
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VI. CONCLUSION
Salamon is the most recent case to analyze the worker classification of admitting
physicians for purposes of Title VII. The Second Circuit's decision in Salamon has
elevated the fact-specific nature of the common-law agency test as applied in the
medical context and redefined how courts assess the physician-hospital relationship.
As hospitals continue to face pressure from third-party payers to control costs, it is
incumbent on hospitals to define and differentiate the relationships maintained with
employed physicians and admitting physicians. To minimize risk of liability, hospitals
must ensure that the standards and policies, peer review programs, and corrective action
procedures they impose on admitting physicians are aligned with government standards
and not aimed at influencing physician behavior or maximizing revenue.
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